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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS
IN THE DISTRICT COURT
The caption of the case on appeal contains the names of all parties to the
proceedings in the district court.
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JURISDICTION OF THE APPELLATE COURT
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(h)
(1953, as amended).
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Is defendant entitled to an adjustment in the base child support award as of
September 2, 1995, when his daughter, Laura Ann Johansen ("Laura"), became 18 years
of age and again on October 1, 1997 when his daughter, Lynsay Johansen ("Lynsay"),
became 18 years of age pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.10 (1953, as amended)?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The proper interpretation of a statute is a question of law which is reviewed for
correctness, according no deference to the trial court's legal conclusion. State v. Redd,
992 P.2d 986 (Utah 1999).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE
78-45-7.10

Adjustment when child becomes emancipated.

(1) When a child becomes 18 years of age, or has graduated from high school
during the child's normal and expected year of graduation, whichever occurs later,
the base child support award is automatically adjusted to reflect the base combined
child support obligation shown in the table for the remaining number of children
due child support, unless otherwise provided in the child support order.
(2) The award may not be reduced by a per child amount derived from the base
child support award originally ordered.
(3) The income used for purposes of adjusting the support shall be the income of
the parties at the time of the entry of the original order. If income was not listed in
the findings or order and worksheets were not submitted, the parties may submit
tax returns or other verification of the income.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This is an action to adjust the base child support award relating to two children,
Laura and Lynsay, as of the time they became 18 years old and to obtain an adjustment of
arrearages allegedly owed by defendant.
Course of Proceedings
Defendant filed his Petition to Modify Divorce Decree on February 15, 2000. R.
111-13. Intervenor filed its answer on March 7, 2000 and plaintiff filed her answer on
March 8, 2000. R. 120-24.
Defendant filed his Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on March 15, 2000. R.
125-26. A hearing on the motion was heard by the Third District Court, the Honorable
Timothy R. Hansen presiding, on June 19, 2000. R. 172. The Court issued a Minute
Entry on July 3, 2000 denying defendant's motion. R. 173-77. On October 24, 2000, the
Court signed the "Order on Respondent's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment"
denying the motion. R. 180-85.
Final judgment resolving all issues in the matter was entered November 14, 2000.
R. 198-200. Defendant filed the Notice of Appeal on December 14, 2000. R. 201-02.
STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS
The following facts were undisputed by all parties:
1.

The parties' Decree of Divorce (the "Decree") was entered on or about

January 6, 1989. R. 71-76.
2

2.

When the parties divorced, they had three minor children, Laura, Lynsay

and Leisa. R. 72.
3.

The parties' Decree awarded plaintiff $545.00 per month in child support

for the parties' three minor children. R. 74.
4.

The Decree did not specify a per child amount of support. R. 74.

5.

Although the Decree refers to the Utah State Child Support Schedule, it did

not include a child support worksheet. R. 71-76.
6.

The Decree did not address changes in defendant's child support obligation

when the children reached the age of majority. R. 71-76.
7.

Laura became 18 years of age on September 2, 1995. R. 112, 120, 127,

8.

Lynsay became 18 years of age on October 1, 1997. R. 112, 120, 127, 149.

9.

Intervenor collected child support and sought to collect arrears from

149.

defendant after the children's eighteenth birthdays at the original child support amount
without any adjustment. R. 112, 121, 129, 136-42.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court ruled that Section 78-45-7.10 did not apply because it became
effective after the Decree was entered in this case. Newly enacted legislation applies so
long as it does not affect vested rights. No one has a vested right in a child support order
because the court has continuing jurisdiction to modify or vacate such an order at any
time in the future. Hence, Section 78-45-7.10 applies to the Decree in this matter.
3

Section 78-45-7.10 requires an adjustment to an obligor parent's base child
support award when the child becomes 18 years old. Based on the plain language of
Section 78-45-7.10, the adjustment is automatic and applies as of the date a child
becomes 18 years old. Nobody really disputes the automatic nature of the adjustment.
This Court has applied the adjustment automatically and retroactively from the date of a
party's petition to modify back to a child's eighteenth birthday. Termination of child
support as of the childrens' eighteenth birthdays in this case is consistent with the express
language of the Decree. If defendant does not receive the benefit of the adjustment as of
the childrens' eighteenth birthday, then child support will have been effectively extended
beyond their majority age without any finding of special or unusual circumstances. The
trial court and the Intervenor were mostly concerned with the method of calculating the
adjustment, but failed to apply the method proffered by the defendant and expressly
provided for by Section 78-45-7.10.
ARGUMENT
I. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-7.10 CONTROLS
The Decree was entered January 6, 1989. Section 78-45-7.10 first became
effective April 24, 1989. Laws of Utah 1989, Chapter 214. The trial court ruled that
Section 78-45-7.10 "applies to divorce decrees that were entered following the effective
date of the statute" and that "[b]ecause the decree of divorce was entered prior to the
adoption of the Guidelines, it was incumbent upon respondent, upon each child attaining
the age of 18, to seek a modification of the decree so that the Court could determine
4

respondent's child support obligation for the remaining children." R. 183. The trial court
erred in refusing to apply Section 78-45-7.10 to the Decree in this case.
In Utah, newly enacted statutes apply so long as they do not "modify vested rights
or interests." Pilcher v. State, 663 P.2d 450, 455 (Utah 1983). Section 78-45-7.10 does
not affect "vested rights." In Wiker v. Wiker, 600 P.2d 514 (Utah 1978), the Utah
Supreme Court held that no one has any vested rights in a decree awarding child support.
Id. at 515. The parties' divorce decree awarded support until the child reached his
majority. Id. at 514. When the court entered the decree, the majority age was 21.
Subsequently, a statutory amendment lowering the age of majority from 21 to 18 became
effective. Id. at 515. The custodial parent argued that the newly enacted statute should
not apply and that support should continue until the child became 21. Id. at 515-14.
The trial court refused to require support beyond the child's eighteenth birthday.
Id. at 514. The Utah Supreme Court affirmed. Id. at 515-16. Among other things, the
Utah Supreme Court reasoned that the trial court's action did not divest the custodial
parent of any vested rights. "[N]o one has any vested rights in a support decree which
statutorily may be changed from time to time by a court under its continuing jurisdiction .
..."* Id. at 515. The Utah Supreme Court concluded "that the amendment. ..
x

Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.6(l)(a) (1953, as amended) further supports the
absence of any vested rights in future child support payments. Section 30-3-10.6(l)(a)
states that "[ejach payment or installment of child . . . support is, on and after the date is
due . . . a judgment with the same attributes and effect of any judgment of a district
court." Hence, child support payments cannot vest until "on or after the date" the
payment is due.
5

effectively, eliminated Mr. Wiker's obligation to support Roger after attaining his
majority . . . ." Id. at 515-16. Because there is no vested right in child support payments,
a court can modify or vacate the support order, including terminating support pursuant to
Section 78-45-7.10.
See also, Dowling v. Dowling, 679 P.2d 480, 482 (Alaska 1984)("Since a child
support order is modifiable after judgment upon a showing of substantial change in
circumstances, a child's right to future, unaccrued installments of child support is not a
vested right."); Kocherov v. Kocherov, 775 S.W.2d 539, 539-40 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989)(A
judgment for child support may be modified to terminate support after passage of a
statute which provides that the obligation to make support payments shall terminate when
a child reaches 18.); Stanley v. Stanley, 541 P.2d 382, 383 (Ariz. 1975)(statute lowering
age of majority was neither prospective nor retrospective because it affected all minors).
Jungjohann v. Jungjohann, 516 P.2d 904, 907-09 (Kan. 1973)(A statute lowering the age
of majority to 18 only terminated child support prospectively.); Beaudry v. Beaudry, 312
A. 2d 922, 925 (Vt. 1973)(No rights vested in a child support judgment and hence, no
rights were divested when the age of majority was changed.); Schmitz v. Schmitz, 236
N.W.2d 657, 662 (Wis. 1975)("To call child support payments a vested right
misconceives their nature.").
Based on the foregoing, Section 78-45-7.10 applies to the Decree in this case even
though that statute did not become effective until after entry of the Decree.

6

II. SECTION 78-45-7. IP's ADJUSTMENT IS AUTOMATIC
It is undisputed that when Section 78-45-7.10 applies, the obligor parent is not
required to file a petition to receive the benefit of the child support adjustment. Section
78-45-7.10 states, in pertinent part: "When a child becomes 18 years of age . . . the base
child support award is automatically adjusted

" In deciding questions of statutory

interpretation, the Court should look "first to the plain language of a statute." Biddle v.
Washington Terrace City, 993 P.2d 875, 879 (Utah 1999). In addition, the Court should
assume "that each term was used advisedly by the legislature." Id. Finally, the Court
should "give effect to each term according to its ordinary and accepted meaning."
Arredondo v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc., 418 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah 2001). The
operative term in Section 78-45-7.10 is that the adjustment occurs "automatically" when
the child becomesl8 years of age. "Automatic" means "acting or operating in a manner
essentially independent of external influence or control.... Self regulating.... Without
volition or conscious control." The American Heritage Dictionary, 143 (2d College Ed.
1982). If defendant were required to file a petition to effectuate the "automatic"
adjustment prior to the children's eighteenth birthdays the adjustment would not be
"automatic."
A. This Court Terminated Child Support Pursuant To Section 78-45-7.10 Even Though
A Petition To Modify Was Filed Several Months After Children Became 18
In Ball v. Peterson, 912 P.2d 1006 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), one child turned 18 in
February or March 1992. Id. at 1008. Another child turned 18 in September 1993. The
7

obligor parent did not file a petition to modify until December 1993, nearly two years
after the first child turned 18 and three months after the second child turned 18. The
Utah Court of Appeals remanded the case "for the court to impose this automatic change
when [the first child] turned 18 years of age. We also reverse and remand the court's
order for the purpose of making the necessary change to reflect the automatic decrease in
Mr. Peterson's support obligation when [the second child] turned 18 years of age . . . . "
Id. at 1015. Based on Ball v. Peterson, defendant is entitled to automatic adjustment of
the child support as of the dates Laura and Lynsay turned 18.
B. Nobody Really Disputed The Automatic Nature Of The Adjustment
Neither the plaintiff, the Intervenor nor the trial court seemed to contest the
automatic nature of the adjustment in those cases where Section 78-45-7.10 applies. The
plaintiff never challenged the automatic nature of Section 78-45-7.10's adjustment. R.
149-50, 212 (Transcript, at 19-23, 27-28).2 During oral argument, the Intervenor
conceded the automatic nature of the adjustment: "Mr. Robinson argued that the State's
position was that a petition has to be filed every time a child emancipates. That is not
true. ORS automatically reduces child support regularly, and would've adjusted Mr.
Johansen's . .. ." R. 212 (Transcript, at 17). "[T]he issue in this case is not whether the
automatic child support reduction feature of 78-45-7 applies in this case. The State

2

PlaintifFs sole argument was that the Decree was entered before Section 78-45-7.10
became effective and therefore, that Section's automatic adjustment did not apply. R. 212
(Transcript, at 19-23, 27-28).
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concedes that it would apply if the Decree of Divorce provided a basis for recalculation
support." R. 212 (Transcript, at 12)(emphasis added). The trial court's order states:
"[Section 78-45-7.10][,] that provides for an automatic reduction of child support
when a child reaches age 18[,] clearly applies to divorce decrees that were entered
following the effective date of the statute." R. 183 (emphasis and punctuation added).
The highlighted portion of the trial court's ruling acknowledges the "automatic" nature of
Section 78-45-7.10's adjustment. The only real dispute below was whether or not Section
78-45-7.10 applied to the Decree because it became effective after the Decree was
entered. As established previously, it does apply to the Decree in this case. Therefore,
defendant is entitled to the Section's automatic adjustment.
C. An Automatic Adjustment Is Consistent With The Language Of The Decree
An automatic adjustment as of the children's eighteenth birthdays is consistent
with the language of the Decree. The Decree states: "Plaintiff is in need of monies for
the support of the minor children of the parties." R. 74 (emphasis added). Children
reach majority age at 18. Utah Code Ann. § 15-2-1 (1953, as amended). The trial court
acknowledged that that language of the Decree required termination of child support
when the children became eighteen years old.
Ms. Nicholas:

The Decree does not state when child support should

terminate, as I recall the Decree.
The Court:

Oh, but it does.

Ms. Nicholas:

Oh.
9

The Court: 'Plaintiff is in need of monies for the support of the minor
children of the parties.' And it doesn't take a big leap to say, when the child
reaches their majority, then they don't-then they aren't in need of any support.
R. 212 (Transcript, at 15-16). Applying Section 78-45-7.10 as of the children's
eighteenth birthdays would not contradict the express language of the decree.
D. Support Cannot Extend Beyond Age 18 Absent Special Circumstances
The Utah Supreme Court has held that child support cannot be ordered to extend
beyond a child's eighteenth birthday in the absence of a finding of special or unusual
circumstances. Ferguson v. Ferguson, 578 P.2d 1274, 1275 (Utah 1978). See also,
Carlson v. Carlson, 584 P.2d 864, 866, (Utah 1978)(In the absence of a finding of special
or unusual circumstances, child support cannot be ordered to extend beyond 18.); Harris
v. Harris, 585 P.2d 435, 437 (Utah 1978)(It was an abuse of discretion to order child
support to age 21 where the trial court made no findings of any special or unusual
circumstances.). The trial court acknowledged that a parent is not required to support a
child who reaches majority age. "[Y]ou only have to support your children as long
they're minors, and I think that's been the law for a long time-long before the adoption of
the guidelines . . . ." R. 212 (Transcript, at 16). The trial court also recognized that the
Decree provided no basis for extending support beyond the children's eighteenth
birthdays. "Is it fair that [defendant] pays child support for children that have reached
their majority? This Decree didn't contemplate that." R. 212 (Transcript, at 15). At no
time has the plaintiff or the Intervenor sought a finding of special or unusual
circumstances to require payment of child support beyond the children's eighteenth
10

birthdays. If defendant does not receive the benefit of Section 78-45-7.10fs automatic
adjustment as of Laura's and Lynsay's eighteenth birthdays, then defendant's child
support obligation will have been effectively extended in violation of the Utah Supreme
Court's rulings in Carlson, Feguson and Harris?
E. Calculating The Adjustment
The trial court's and the Intervenor's primary concern seemed to be the absence of
a basis in the Decree to calculate the adjustment as of the children's 18th birthdays. "The
State concedes that [Section 78-45-7.10] would apply if the Decree of Divorce provided
a basis for recalculation support." R. 212 (Transcript, at 12)(emphasis added).
"Without a basis for recalculation, ORS cannot automatically reduce . . . ." R. 212
(Transcript, at 14). The trial court's conclusions of law were based on the absence of a
recalculation basis:
5.
While the decree refers to the 'Utah State Child Support Schedule',
there was no child support worksheet supplied with the divorce decree.
6.
The findings of fact and conclusions of law do not set forth the
amount of child support to be paid for each child.
7.
The decree does not specify the respective incomes of the parties
which would enable the Court to calculate child support for three children based
on income.
R. 182-83. Based on those findings, the trial court concluded:
2.
Because the parties' decree neither specifies a per-child amount of
child support nor the incomes of the parties at the time the decree was entered, it is
impossible for the Court to evaluate retroactively what child support should have

3

In Laura's case, support will have been extended from 18 to 22V£ years old and in
Lynsay's case, support will have been extended from 18 to a little more than 20 years old.
11

been when the first child reached age 18 or when the second child reached age 18.
R. 183. The Intervenor conceded it would adjust defendant's support obligation if it had
guidance from the legislature. "If ORS had guidancefromthe legislature . . . as to how to
reduce that child support automatically, ORS would reduce it." R. 212 (Transcript, at
16). Section 78-45-7.10 expressly provided the basis for recalculating defendant's
support obligation. Section 78-45-7.10(3) states:
The income used for purposes of adjusting the support shall be the income
of the parties at the time of the entry of the original order. If income was not listed
in the findings or order and worksheets were not submitted, the parties may submit
tax returns or other verification of the income.
Id. Defendant presented the trial court with that method of determining the adjustment:
The Court:

. . . what's the reduction going to be to?

Mr. Robinson:
Well... I think the argument would be this, that we'd
go back to the 1988 period and we would take the initial guidelines that were
enacted and would look at the incomes at that period of time and apply the
reduction, based on those incomes. And I think that's the way we would go about
doing it.
R. 212 (Transcript, at 5). The trial court seemed to reject defendant's proffer during oral
argument, Id., and expressly rejected it in its order. R. 183. The trial court erred when it
failed to implement the method for calculating the automatic adjustment as proffered by
defendant and expressly required by Section 78-45-7.10(3).
CONCLUSION
The trial court's decision to deny defendant's motion for summary judgment was
incorrect. The trial court erred in refusing to apply the automatic child support
12

adjustment in Section 78-45-7.10 to the parties' Decree. Defendant was entitled as a
matter of law to an automatic adjustment as of September 2, 1995, when Laura became
18 and again as of October 1, 1997 when Lynsay became 18. Defendant was further
entitled as a matter of law to an order compelling the Intervenor to adjust the arrearages
owed by defendant and an order prohibiting Intervenor from withholding any further
arrearages from defendant's wages pending a readjustment of defendant's arrearages
consistent with the automatic adjustment required by Section 78-45-710.
Defendant requests that (1) the trial court's decision be reversed, (2) defendant's
child support be recalculated and adjusted as of September 2, 1995, when Laura became
18 and again as of October 1, 1997 when Lynsay became 18, (3) Intervenor be required
to adjust any arrearages owed by defendant as a result of the automatic adjustment, and
(4) Intervenor be prohibited from collecting any further arrearages from defendant until
child support has been recalculated and adjusted and defendant's arrearages have been
adjusted consistent with that recalculation and adjustment.
DATED:

April 30, 2001
ROBINSON & SHEEN, L.L.C.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

KATHRYN ANN JOHANSEN, nfca
KATHRYN ANN TURNER,
Petitioner,

MINUTE ENTRY
CASE NO.

874904472

vs.
PAUL R. JOHANSEN,
Respondent•
STATE OF UTAH, Division of
Human Services, Office of
Recovery Services,
Intervener•

This matter was before the Court on June 19, 2000 for argument
on respondent's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
were present and/or represented by counsel.

The parties

The Court heard

counsel's argument on the respondent's Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment, and thereafter took the matter under advisement to
further consider the written submissions of the parties, and to
consider the statutory references referred to during the course of
oral argument.

The Court has had an opportunity to once again

review the written submissions of the parties, consider the oral
argument of counsel, review the applicable statutes, and being
fully advised is satisfied that the respondent's Motion for Summary
Judgment must be denied.

JOHANSEN V. JOHANSEN
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In this case the respondent sought a judicial determination as
a matter of law that his child support obligation should have been
automatically adjusted when his two oldest children reached age 18
on September 1, 1995 and October 1, 1997.

Respondent relies on

Section 78-45-7.10 of the Utah Code Ann., 1953 as amended, which
proscribes, ,fWhen a child becomes 18 years of age...the base child
support award is automatically reduced to reflect the lower base
combined child support obligation shown in the table for the
remaining number of children due child support...."
Respondent asserts that his child support should have been
automatically reduced and that the efforts of the intervenor, State
of Utah, to collect child support in the full amount ordered under
the

divorce

Decree

is

inappropriate.

The

respondent

seeks

retroactive application of his Motion back to the time the two
children turned age 18.
This is a divorce Decree that was entered prior to the
effective date of the child support guidelines as promulgated by
the Utah legislature. The effective date of the guidelines and the
effective

provisions,

the

above-referenced

therein, was July 1, 1989.

statute

included

The divorce Decree was entered on

January 6, 1989, pursuant to stipulation between the parties.

In

paragraph

to

5 of that divorce

Decree, the Court, pursuant

stipulation, ordered child support in the amount of $545.

It was

JOHANSEN V. JOHANSEN
for three children.
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While the Decree refers to Utah state child

support schedule, there was no child support worksheet supplied
with the divorce Decree, and the Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law do not set forth the amount of child support being paid for
each child, nor is there any indication as to the respective income
of the parties which would allow the Court to make some type of
determination as to what child support ought to be for three
children based on the income of the parties, even though the child
support guidelines were not yet effective.
The statutory provision above-referenced that provides for an
automatic reduction of child support when a child reaches age 18
clearly applies to divorce Decrees that were entered following the
effective date of the child support guideline statutes1 effective
date. The references in Section 78-45-7.10 clearly make reference
to child support guidelines. Because of the nature of the Decree,
it is impossible for the Court to evaluate retroactively what child
support may have been when the first child reached age 18 or when
the second child reached age 18.
Because the Decree of Divorce was in place prior to the
inception of the child support guidelines, it was incumbent upon
the respondent, upon each child reaching

age 18, to seek a

modification of the Court's Order, for a redetermination of what
child support would properly be for the remaining children.

The

JOHANSEN V. JOHANSEN

PAGE 4

MINUTE ENTRY

respondent did not undertake such action, and can now not claim a
retroactive application beyond the date of filing the Petition to
Modify, filed February 15, 2000.
For

the

foregoing

reasons

and

those

set

forth

by the

intervenor and the petitioner, the Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment is denied.

Counsel for the intervenor is to prepare an

appropriate Order showing that the Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment is denied, and submit the same to the Court in accordance
with the Code of Judicial Administration.
By way of suggestion but not by way of Order, the parties may
wish to determine the respective incomes of the petitioner and the
respondent, apply the child support guidelines as they currently
exist, so as to determine the ongoing child support amounts that
would be due the petitioner from the respondent for the last
remaining minor child.
reduction

based

The respondent is clearly entitled to a

upon the oldest two children

reaching their

majority, the question is merely the ^mount of child support that
should be ongoing.
Dated this y

day of oun^
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foregoing Minute Entry, to the following, this
2000:

Steven C. Russell
Attorney for Petitioner
180 South 300 West, Suite 170
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Jeffrey Robinson
Attorney for Respondent
1366 E. Murray-Holladay Road
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
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Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Intervenor
515 East 100 South, 8th Floor
P.O. Box 1980
Salt Lake City, Utah
84110
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P.O. Box 1980
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84110
Telephone: (801) 536-8372
F a x : (801) 5 3 6 - 8 3 1 5
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
KATHRYN ANN JOHANSEN (AKA TURNER),
Petitioner,
vs.
PAUL R. JOHANSEN,
Respondent.

ORDER ON RESPONDENT'S
MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Civil No. D87-4472
Judge TIMOTHY R. HANSON
Comm

STATE OF UTAH, Office of
Recovery Services,
Intervenor.

This matter came before the court on June 19, 2 000, the
Honorable Timothy R. Hanson presiding, pursuant to respondent's
motion for partial summary judgment in connection with his
petition to modify the parties' decree of divorce.

Petitioner

Kathryn Ann Johansen, nka Kathryn Ann Turner, was present with
her counsel, Steven Russell.

Respondent Paul R. Johansen was

present with his counsel, Jeffrey Robinson.

The State of Utah,

KATHRYN ANN JOHANSEN (aka TURNER) vs. PAUL R. JOHANSEN
State of Utah-Intervenor
Order
Page 2

Office of Recovery Services, was represented by Assistant
Attorney General Lynn Nicholas.
ISSUES BEFORE THE COURT
Respondent sought a judicial determination as a matter of
law that his child support obligation should have been
automatically adjusted when his two oldest children reached age
18 on September 1, 1995 and October 1, 1997, respectively.
Respondent relied on Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.10 which provides:
"When a child becomes 18 years of age...the base child support
award is automatically reduced to reflect the lower base combined
child support obligation shown in the table for the remaining
number of children due child support...."
Respondent asserted that his child support should have been
automatically reduced and that the Office of Recovery Services'
continued collection of child support in the full amount ordered
under the divorce decree was inappropriate.

Respondent sought

retroactive modification of the decree to the time each of the
two oldest children attained the age of majority.
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The Court, having heard the arguments of counsel, having
taken the matter under advisement, having considered the written
submissions of the parties and the statutory references, being
fully advised and good cause appearing, now enters the following:

\ V
FINDINGS OF FACT (c^DtTPvJ-T©) \
1.

The parties' divorce decree was entered prior to the

adoption of child support guidelines ("Guidelines'') by the Utah
State Legislature.
2.

The divorce decree was entered on January 6, 1989,

pursuant to stipulation between the parties.
3.

The effective date of the statute in which the

Guidelines were initially promulgated was July 1, 1989.
4.

In paragraph 5 of the divorce decree, the Court,

pursuant to stipulation, ordered child support in the amount of
$545.OC for the parties' three children.
5.

While the decree refers to the "Utah State Child

Support Schedule", there was no child support worksheet supplied
with the divorce decree.
6.

The findings of fact and conclusions of law do not set

forth the amount of child suooort to be oaid for each child.
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7.

The decree does not specify the respective incomes of

the parties which would enable the Court to calculate child
support for three children based on income.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The above-referenced statutory provision that provides

for an automatic reduction of child support when a child reaches
age 18 clearly applies to divorce decrees that were entered
following the effective date of the statute.
2.

Because the parties' decree neither specifies a per-

child amount of child support nor the incomes of the parties at
the time the decree was entered, it is impossible for the Court
to evaluate retroactively what child support should have been
when the first child reached age 18 or when the second child
reached age 18.
3.

Because the decree of divorce was entered prior to the

adoption of the Guidelines, it was incumbent upon respondent,
upon each child attaining the age of 18, to seek a modification
of the decree so that the Court could determine respondent's
child support obligation for the remaining children-
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4.

The respondent did not undertake such action and cannot

now claim a retroactive application of the statute beyond the
date of filing his petition to modify on February 15, 2000.
ORDER
For the foregoing reasons and those; set forth by the

KATHRYN ANN JOHANSEN

( a k a TURNER)

vs.

PAUL R.

JOHANSEN
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify

that

I m a i l e d a t r u e and c o r r e c t copy of

t h e f o r e g o i n g Order t o t h e f o l l o w i n g t h i s

<yQ

day of

2000.

STEVEN C. RUSSELL
ATTORNEY FOR KATHRYN TURNER
180 S 300 W, SUITE 170
SALT LAKE CITY UT 34101
JEFFREY ROBINSON
ATTORNEY FOR PAUL JCHNANSEN
13 66 E MURRAY-HOLLADAY ROAD
SALT LAKE CITY UT 34117
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